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Development aid discourse in Danish agriculture, 1960-1970**

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The Global Development Race and the Samaritan's Dilemma: Development Aid Discourse in Danish Agriculture, 1960-1970

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Abstract

Why has 'development aid' been donated by so-called developed to under-developed populations since World War II? Using discourse analysis, this article provides partial answers to this riddle. First, we suggest that donor motives may be rooted in an ideology of 'being good' which, paradoxically, motivates recipients to be helpless, i.e. a Samaritan's Dilemma. Second, drawing on journal articles from 1960-1970, we test this theory by tracing a global development discourse and 'goodness ideology' in a Western country like Denmark – a process that was strongly influenced by the agricultural co-operative movement, which sought to export the 'Danish cooperative model'.

Introduction

Development research abounds with mainstream macroeconomic studies. They tend to focus on how political-economic instruments may enhance economic growth in less developed countries.¹ Albert Hirschman and William Easterly are among the few economists to provide (quasi)cultural-ideological explanations of the shortcomings of international development aid programmes.²

Early on, Hirschman cautioned against giving grants to “aid-hungry governments” that would not have implemented the wanted policies (e.g. economic reforms) if aid had *not* been given. Such aid would involve high “hidden costs” and perhaps even nurture ‘recipient cultures’ consisting of unreliable politicians and unsustainable economies.³ Similarly, Easterly argued that failure most often is due to lack of incentives among “the

¹ See World Bank, *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); C. Burnside and D. Dollar, ‘Aid, policies and growth’, Policy Research Paper, 1777 (World Bank, 1997); S.M.N. Islam, *Optimal Growth Economics: An Investigation of the Contemporary Issues and the Prospect for Sustainable Growth* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2001); H. White, ‘The macroeconomic impact of development aid: A critical survey’, *Journal of Development Studies*, 28, 2 (1992), 163-240; T. Ovaska, ‘The failure of development aid’, *Cato Journal*, 23, 2 (2003), 175-88. In recent years, the economic freedom factor has also played an increasing role; see e.g. J. Haan, and J-E. Sturm, “On the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth.” *Working paper* 1999/3. University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research. (1999); J.H. Cole, “The contribution of economic freedom to world economic growth 1980-99”, *Cato Journal*, vol. 23, no. 2: 46-57 (2003).

² W. Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2001); W. Easterly, “Why doesn't aid work”. *Cato unbound*, April 3, 2006: <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/04/03/william-easterly/why-doesnt-aid-work> (2006a; date of access: 12 November 2006).

³ A.O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 205-7.

players of the development game”.⁴ This includes lack of consensus among rivaling groups in recipient countries to promote overall economic growth at the national level.

Easterly’s critique of the inefficiency of development aid is further developed in his recent book, where he suggests that aid might even be harmful:

“The West’s efforts to aid the Rest have been even less successful at goals such as promoting rapid economic growth, changes in government economic policy to facilitate markets, or promotion of honest and democratic government. The evidence is stark: \$568 billion spent on aid to Africa, and yet the typical African country no richer today than 40 years ago. Dozens of “structural adjustment” loans (...) made to Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America, only to see the failure of both policy reform and economic growth. The evidence suggests that aid results in less democratic and honest government, not more”.⁵

This pessimism may be exaggerated and Easterly and most others do not deny that individual development aid projects may have significant positive effects. Nevertheless, Easterly presents what may be termed the development aid puzzle: Why have Development Assistance Committee members (DAC-countries) continued to pour billions of dollars into poor countries over the last 60 years *despite evident failure*? Do we have a Samaritan’s Dilemma on our hands? Or has implementation simply failed?

[Table 1]

Table 1 shows that this substantial money flow has not decreased, rather to the contrary. Whether we include all receipts as in the table (official development assistance, private donors, debt relief, etc.) or use official development assistance (ODA) alone, 2005 was a record year. And nothing indicates that this tendency will stop in the near future.⁶

In the literature three motives have been stressed: altruism, political ideology (pro- or anti-Communism) and national self-interest.⁷ Certainly, for powerful global actors such as the US, France and Japan, political, military and economic (trade) interests might seem as primary motives. ‘Non-altruism’ is arguably part of the explanation, especially from the policy-maker perspective.

However, we here want to emphasise that this major reallocation of resources, which escalated during the 1960s, was *fully voluntary*, i.e. no threats of violence and nor even demands by recipient countries. Note also that until today these often risky investments have widespread support among tax-payers in donor countries – citizens who choose to donate money to strangers living thousands of miles away and, moreover, accept very poor control over how this money is spent. Therefore, we suggest an *ideology matters* approach to explain the aid riddle, a ‘goodness ideology’ that can

⁴ W. Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006b), p. 289.

⁵ Easterly (2006a), p. 1.

⁶ See Finfacts Team, ‘OECD says Development Aid flows top \$100 billion in 2005’ (2006): <http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article10005427.shtml> (Date of access: 8 May 007).

⁷ For an overview, see J. Schraeder, S.W. Hook and B. Taylor, ‘Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows’, *World Politics*, 50, 2 (1998), 294-323.

be traced back to the 1948 UN Human Rights declaration.⁸ We do not suggest that this specific altruistic ideology – or ‘goodness ideology’ – prevailed in all donor countries. Historical sources, however, strongly suggest that in Scandinavian countries like Denmark, this factor more than anything triggered development aid in the pioneering period from the early 1950s to about 1970, rather than political or economic concerns or abstract altruism.

Development discourse

By focusing on development aid as an outcome of altruistic ideology on the part of donor-citizens we hope to fill a gap in existing literature. There is a lack of thorough historical analyses that consider such ideological and discursive elements within a framework of adequate social science theory. There are examples of detailed, archive-based historical accounts, e.g. in a recent special issue of *Contemporary European History* entitled “Europe and the first development decade”.⁹ But theoretical frameworks are often poorly developed or simply absent.

Many modernisation theorists distinguish between poor (underdeveloped) and rich (developed) societies, suggesting that economic development proceeds along a straight unambiguous line.¹⁰ The ‘naturalness’ of such phenomena has been strongly questioned by Arturo Escobar, who convincingly argues that development as a discourse was constructed by post-war development policy-makers in the US and Europe.¹¹ Over a few years, this discourse became so strong that a space was created in which only certain things could be said (by both those for and those against current development strategies). It strongly contributed to legitimating the voices of Western ‘experts’. Overall, Gilman views modernisation theory as high-concept version of Americanism, implying materialism without class conflict, secularism without irreverence and democracy without disobedience. Along the same line, Rist argues that underdeveloped peoples were now forced to travel the ‘development path’ mapped out for them by others. Stoler and Cooper relate this discourse of development to colonial encounters and ‘civilizing missions.’¹²

Development discourse is of considerable interest to scholars from a number of disciplines (history, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, agriculture). Still, social constructivist inspired perspectives on development aid as an ‘invented’ or ‘constructed’ *relation* between rich and poor countries are scarce. This is partly due to

⁸ In particular in Article 22, which states that: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international co-operation (...) of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and free development of his personality”, cited from UN, ‘Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’: <http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm> (Date of access: 8 May 2007). Space does not permit further exploration of the relation between large-scale development aid and the HR declaration.

⁹ H.I. Schmidt and H. Pharo, “Introduction”. *Contemporary European History* (Special issue, “Europe and the First Development Decade. The Foreign Economic Assistance Policy of European Donor Countries, 1958-1972”), vol. 12, no. 4: 387-394, p. 387 (2003).

¹⁰ M.E. Latham, *Modernisation as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

¹¹ A. Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1995).

¹² N. Gilman, *Imposing modernity: Modernisation theory and Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (2003); Rist, G., *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, London (1997); Stoler, A.L. and F. Cooper, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. University of California Press (1997).

an often one-sided, a-historical, unreflective and ethnocentric focus on economic growth parameters. New perspectives, we argue, tell other stories than the traditional ones, adding new pieces to the development aid puzzle.

Therefore, we want to combine an anthropological-historical approach based on extensive empirical studies of Danish development aid 1950-1970 with a political economy approach (Samaritan's Dilemma), in order to elucidate the 'goodness ideology' established during this period. Furthermore, we will focus on the development aid campaign within the influential Danish Co-operative Movement, using as historical sources the many rural journals and magazines from the period. We have scrutinized every issue of four influential journals to map out and analyse how a specific development aid discourse was formed step by step – influenced by local and global actors. These four journals, whose readership was primarily rural dwellers, are *The Co-operative Magazine* (Andelsbladet), *Danish Youth* (Dansk Ungdom, a magazine occupied with cultural issues), *Weekly Magazine for Farmers* (Ugeskrift for Landmænd), and *Journal of Agricultural Economics* (Tidsskrift for Landøkonomi). The most influential of these was the weekly *The Co-operative Magazine* issued by the Central Co-operative Committee in Denmark. That is one reason why articles from this magazine are used as main sources in the following. We were informed by a former editorial assistant that it was by far the most widely read agricultural magazine during the decade; in the mid-1960s circulation was about 20.000 copies. According to this editorial assistant, and somewhat surprisingly to us, this was mainly because it had exclusive rights to publish weekly quoted prices on agricultural products (!).¹³

This rather narrow empirical study provides some important insights into the ideological climate in a Western country during a period where development aid to so-called 'under-developed' populations suddenly exploded. Thus, we hope that our case study will have much wider implications than the specific Danish context by showing how the twentieth century goodness ideology was discursively constructed by use of nineteenth century evolutionist theory, and how it was to lay the moral foundation for large-scale development aid from the West to the Rest after World War II.¹⁴

More specifically, our thesis is that the West European discussions on 'development' may be derived from the evolutionary line of thought within the social sciences. Darwin's survival theory in *The Origin of the Species* (1859) was adopted as the main principle for understanding the development of civilisation. Other early examples are Edward Tylor's history of institutions, Herbert Spencer's history of progress and the attempts by Lewis Morgan and Friedrich Engels to trace the origins of the family.¹⁵

In these macro interpretations of human history, the Latin word 'development'

¹³ Interview 8 May 2007 with former editorial assistant Tove Sølvsteen. When the last volume (vol. 106) of *Andelsbladet* was published in 2005, circulation was at the lowest level in all years, 6,700 copies. Circulation was not reported in the 1960s volumes, making the interview necessary. That also holds for the three other publications. However, we know that their circulations were significantly lower, probably no more than 5000.

¹⁴ This is an interesting example of what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu termed a *theorisation effect*, a symbolic practice that contributes to shape reality – just like Marxian terms such as 'the class struggle' did. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 178; *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 134.

¹⁵ E.B. Tylor, *Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, language, art and customs*, New York: Henry Holt (1871); H. Spencer, *The Study of Sociology*. Henry S. King, London (1873); L.H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London: Macmillan (1877); F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, 4th edition, London: Lawrence & Wishart (1884). (See also P. Hirst, *Social Evolution and Sociological Categories*. Controversies in Sociology. Series 5. London: Allen & Unwin 1976.)).

(orig. from French *développer*, ‘to unwrap’, derived from Latin *develare*, ‘to reveal’) assumed a particular normative significance, dividing the populations of the world into two halves: The successful and the less successful. Or put otherwise, ‘development’ as literally *revealing* population groups as being at various stages of development according to the ladder metaphor.

Empirically, social-evolutionist theories were confirmed by case studies of ‘primitive societies’ at the first stages of development. Thus, distances in space came to equalise distances in developmental stages (rungs on a ladder), and it gradually became a widely held notion to view history as a ‘Global development race’ between cultures and nations – no matter if the purpose of this development was seen as the communist society, capitalism or technological perfection.

In fact, Western scientists were quite successful in promoting the idea of history as an evolutionary and teleological process; perhaps they still are. They posited that in the race of cultures in space there are ‘speedy’ and highly developed cultures or nations as well as slow and backward ones. Hence, this line of thought was adopted not only by Western populations but, also by the so-called ‘primitive’ or ‘backward’ peoples themselves – cf. Escobar’s observations.¹⁶ In a similar approach, and much in line with Stoler and Cooper, anthropologist Johannes Fabian¹⁷ termed this phenomenon *allochronic discourses*. That is, Western scientific discourses placing non-Western peoples and cultures in other (previous) times, thereby constructing them as less developed than the peoples and cultures to which the scientists themselves belonged. Thus science, or more specifically, *ethnography* helped create “an allochronic discourse according to which the other never occupies the same historical time as the Western observer”. In this way, non-Western countries became *Third World* countries.¹⁸ Such equalisations of time and space also show up in other anthropological case studies, most famously in Edward Said’s seminal book *Orientalism*.¹⁹

Our Danish case study shows that the evolutionist ideas of the nineteenth century were adopted in agricultural circles in Western countries, not least after World War II. At that time, evolutionist terminology was transformed into an abstract and academic development terminology comprising a whole ‘family’ of powerful concepts. At the core of this ‘allochronic’ discourse was The Development, sometimes further specified (albeit no less abstractly) as The Structural Changes, The Centralisation or The Globalisation, always implying a risk of cultural stagnation. Such terminology not only encouraged an imperative to change the mode of agricultural production. In a dual movement it also became an imperative to help *less* developed countries in the global development race.

In the following, we will trace the development discourse in Denmark 1960-1970, mainly by shedding light on the development aid discourse in the important and world-famous Danish cooperative movement. Due to a strong ambition to export the successful ‘Danish cooperative model’ to developing countries, this movement had a major impact on state-sponsored development aid during this period, not least on technical development aid. First, we present the theoretical framework – the assumption of a Samaritan’s Dilemma – in the context of global development aid. Then we trace the formation of a development discourse in Denmark based on what we term a goodness

¹⁶ A. Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (1995).

¹⁷ J. Fabian, *Time and the Other. How Anthropology makes its Object*. Columbia University Press, New York, (1983).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143ff..

¹⁹ E.D. Said, *Orientalism*. Random House, Vintage Books. New York (1978).

ideology. To this end we use printed historical sources, mainly articles from rural, agricultural and cooperative journals and magazines 1960-1970 in what is known as the great era of development aid optimism in Denmark. Finally, we analyse whether Danish development aid is an illustration of the ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’.

The Samaritan’s Dilemma

We hasten to stress that we do not doubt the best intentions of givers, nor do we question the necessity of cross-border solidarity and responsibility. We do, however, point to the problem of the ideology of being good in helping developing countries – hitherto simply called ‘primitive’ societies with no mitigating euphemisms. The often overlooked core problem of countries that apparently cannot make it on their own (and therefore become eligible for help without reciprocal repayment) is that it simply *may pay for recipients to stay helpless*.

In other words, and as argued by political economist James M. Buchanan in his seminal article “The Samaritan’s Dilemma”, a recipient profits from exploiting a donor or ‘Samaritan’, whose dominant strategy is being ‘good’.²⁰ Nannestad says that while the motivations of the Samaritan are morally irreproachable, those of the recipient are not. Basically it is a model of exploitation of the “good” by the “not good”, made possible by the fact that being good is the Samaritan’s dominant strategy. Both players are rational, but have different priorities: being morally good, being materially better off. Cooperation can replace the dominant strategy only if the players share priorities.²¹

Buchanan considered increasing economic affluence as one possible explanation for the pervasive importance of what he called the Samaritan’s Dilemma in twentieth century Western society. Wealth makes it possible to choose ‘soft options’ such as “kindness to criminals.” Furthermore, this softness is strengthened by the ‘Puritan ethic’ where Christian love was ‘love of God,’ which was effectively translated into a set of precepts for personal behaviour.²²

The dilemma arises from the ideology or dominant strategy of being good. Coate, for example, demonstrates how too much altruism may lead to unconditional transfers to the poor, who may then forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss.²³ Likewise, Dijkstra argues that in cases the recipient gets more money from the Samaritan, he will work less than the Samaritan would like him to.

²⁰ J.M. Buchanan, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma”, pp. 71-85 in E. Phelps (ed.) *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*, New York: Russel Sage (1975). See also P.T. Bauer, *Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the economics of development*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (1984); S. Coate, “Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy”, *American Economic Review*, vol. 85, no. 1: 46-57 (1995); D. Schmidtchen, “To help or not to help: The Samaritan’s dilemma revisited”. Discussion paper 9909, Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarland University (1999); K.R. Pedersen, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid.” *International Tax and Public Finance* 8: 693-703 (2001); B.R. Dijkstra, Samaritan versus Rotten Kid: Another Look. Working paper, University of Nottingham (2003).

²¹ P. Nannestad, “Taxing the well-off or the less well-off? Why immigrants on the dole may be the optimal policy for rational egalitarians”. Draft. (2004).

²² Vague threats or promises to cut off charity by a donor in the absence of work on the part of the recipient will remain empty unless there is a demonstrated willingness to carry out such threats. However, as Buchanan puts it: “...to carry these out, the Samaritan will, in actuality, suffer disutility which may be severe. He may find himself seriously injured by the necessity of watching the parasite starve himself while refusing work. Furthermore, even if the parasite works, the Samaritan suffers by his own inability to provide charity” Buchanan (1975: 76).

²³ Coate (1995).

Thus, the less money the recipient earns for himself, the *more needy* he becomes, and the more money he will get from the Samaritan. So, when the recipient moves first, he can extort more money from the Samaritan by working less.²⁴

This ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’ is also present in the case of development aid because donor countries cannot punish recipient countries by refusing to grant more aid because the result would be even more poverty in the short term. Thus, the recipient may be rewarded in economic terms for staying helpless.

Formulated in anthropological terms, the risk is that we end up with no equal and mutually obliging reciprocal relations, that is, we have *unbalanced* reciprocity.²⁵ Moreover, according to Bauer,²⁶ what *motivation* should so-called ‘underdeveloped’, ‘developing’ or ‘depending’ populations have to improve their life conditions to satisfy other people’s abstract ‘the development’ idea of what their future lives ought to be? Or is development aid in essence paid so that recipients accept enforced futures?

As is widely documented in classical anthropological and sociological literature,²⁷ balanced reciprocity, implying balanced power relationships, is only possible when the recipient is granted a *realistic possibility* to pay back – economically or otherwise – in near or far futures. In other words, there seems to be a *break* in reciprocity, leading to powerlessness, dependency and the temptation to stay helpless. Or as Bauer writes: ‘being kept in that state’. Concrete personal relationships based on trust and social control seem to have been replaced by an abstract and impersonal donor relationship ‘system’ without efficient sanction mechanisms.

Contributing to the alleviation of poverty in recipient countries is one of the main goals of most aid organisations. However, stripped of personal contact and thus, of identity, trust and social control, unbalanced reciprocity in the form of unidirectional monetary development aid may often seem *economically unproductive* – mechanisms, which have been observed even in ‘pure’ market exchanges.²⁸

As pointed out by political scientist Elinor Ostrom, it is highly problematic to transfer visible capital (physical, economic, technological) or reified capital (human) to third world countries. Investment in an organisational framework that fosters invisible forms of capital such as social capital should be seen as equally as important as investments in physical capital. Ostrom concludes that “if external agents of change do not take into account the delicate balance of interests [among farmers] embedded in social capital when investments in physical capital are undertaken, efforts to improve productivity can have the opposite effect”.²⁹

Such objections to post-war international development aid also occur in the economic and political science literature. Thus, Pedersen strongly questions whether foreign aid actually reduces poverty.³⁰ Within development economics studies, we find

²⁴ Dijkstra (2003).

²⁵ E.g. Burt 1992. Originally developed by American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins in *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Press, 1972): “The Spirit of the Gift,” pp. 149-183.

²⁶ P.T. Bauer, *From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1984).

²⁷ E.g. G. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. Free Press, New York ([1908] 1955); M. Mauss, *The Gift*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London ([1925] 1969); K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time*. Beacon Hill, Boston, MA (1944); Bourdieu 1977).

²⁸ Y. Ben-Porath, “The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange”, *Population and Development Review*, vol. 6: 1-30 (1980).

²⁹ E. Ostrom, “Constituting social capital and collective action”. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 6, 4: 527-62 (1994: 559).

³⁰ K.R. Pedersen, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid.” *International Tax and Public Finance* 8: 693-703 (2001). See also R. Cassen et al., *Does Aid Work?* Oxford: Clarendon

a school casting doubt on the usefulness of international development aid in its traditional forms, thus questioning the academic development aid optimism of the 1950s and 1960s.³¹ Here the surprising conclusion is that the result is often counterproductive, because long-term development aid may deepen poverty or further skew the relative income distribution.³² In short, we have a Samaritan's Dilemma where the helpless remain helpless.

In the following, we use the case of Danish development aid 1960-1970 in order to shed light on the discourse and ideology of the global development race and its implicit goodness ideology.

The Danish co-operative movement

During the nineteenth century, a broad tradition of civic organisation was established in the Danish rural areas. From the beginning of the century, this organisation was driven by energetic entrepreneurs and institutionalized in the form of associations, so numerous in the last part of the century that the period came to be known as *Foreningstiden*, 'the associations era'.

This new civic society in the Danish country-side emerged after a land reform in about 1800, which transformed a feudal economy into a capitalist free-market one. This motivated many new free-holders among formerly adscripted peasants to establish voluntary insurance associations to cover fire, cattle and health, simply to survive. During the last decades of the century, however, these networks were transformed into voluntary, cooperative associations that provided a range of collective goods as well in so-called 'cooperative villages'. This myriad of co-operative, democratically based associations was established by the peasants themselves, including wholesale societies from 1866, dairies from 1882, feedstuff purchase associations from 1883 and slaughterhouses from 1887 – to mention just the most important sectors. It is important to note that this close economic co-operation between Danish peasants and wealthy as well as poor farmers, also led to the formation of numerous cultural institutions during the second half of the century, community folk high schools, free-schools, village halls, etc. In this way a remarkable economic growth was set in motion alongside new cultural institutions that ultimately paved the way for a democratic take-over of political power by the peasants' party in 1901.³³

In the 1960s, however, the co-operative organisational form underwent fundamental changes. Previously parish based local associations were closed en masse due to organisational centralisation, to the regret of many farmers. How could this happen? Reading rural magazines and journals beginning after World War II and to about 1970 – both those concerned with cultural and with agricultural issues – suggests that at that time development was seen as a *structural* development by the Danish rural population. Furthermore, the word structure (from Lat. *struere*, 'to construct', 'to build') seems to imply that *The* development was a necessary and inevitable one, a kind of mandatory future – however unwanted and feared by the great majority of the

Press (1994); Krueger et al., *Aid and Development*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press (1989); Boone (1996); P.S. Jensen and M. Paldam, Can the new aid-growth models be replicated? Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, *Working Paper* 2003-17 (2003).

³¹ White (1992), p. 168ff.

³² Pedersen (2001); Bauer (2000).

³³ For details see G.L.H. Svendsen and G.T. Svendsen, (2004) *The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Entrepreneurship, Co-operative Movements and Institutions*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2004).

population.³⁴ However, the sources indicate that the Danes did not immediately give way to this new development terminology, including the rural population. Thus, articles in rural journals published around 1960 reveal that Danish farmers found it difficult to understand the amazing Latin words being propagated by agricultural economists and other experts. Moreover, our archive studies on two parish dairies show that farmers even had difficulty in pronouncing and spelling words such as ‘rationalisation’ and ‘fusion’.³⁵ Nonetheless, by the mid-1960s, over an amazingly short period of time, Danish farmers were becoming familiar with the new terminology. The import, internalisation and spread of a new ‘discourse of rurality’ on the initiative of a group of energetic and modernist-minded agricultural leaders and experts gradually affected common farmers.³⁶

In this way *The structural changes* – a term expressing external global market conditions and simultaneously implicitly promoting a modernist worldview – suddenly became reality for the rural population during the 1960s. With respect to empirical evidence, the structural changes were ‘proven’ by statistics, often referred to as ‘the talk of the numbers’ or, in sum, THE DEVELOPMENT. Nobody can resist The development, was the conclusion reached by a still larger group of resigned farmers. Hence, farmers gradually stopped questioning the modernist post-war development paradigm. In fact, in the 1960s open criticism of the leading defenders of ‘the law of development’ almost became unthinkable. The few dissenters who dared raise public critique of The rationalisation, The Centralisation and The structural development were seen as reactionaries by agriculturalist leaders and experts within the in agricultural circles near-hegemonic co-operative movement.

Explicit comparisons were made with developing countries where such reactionary elements also impeded progress and ‘natural development’, as it was often expressed. Some even argued that the Danish rural population – like that in America – lagged behind the more civilized urbanites, implying that the urban-rural relation was a direct reflection of that between developed and developing countries.³⁷

In an article in a Danish agriculturalist journal in 1963, American agronomist Robert C. Cook addressed this issue with reference to the poor black farm-workers in the American south: “With regard to income and upbringing, the rural population is typically far behind the urban population. This inherited difference threatens the rural youth now when our complicated and technological society demands more skills acquired through a more extended education”.³⁸

³⁴ The Danish term *strukturændringer* is a direct translation of ‘structural changes’, corresponding to the German word *strukturwandel* or the French *changement structurel*. It was imported from the US after World War II. Thus, search on article databases reveals that the concept was first developed in the late 1930s in the *American Economic Review*. Alvin H. Hansen (1937: 131) wrote about ‘deep-seated structural changes in economic institutions’ after World War I in his paper “The Situation of Gold Today in Relation to World Currencies”. *The American Review of Economics*, vol. 27, no. 1: 130–40 (1937). In the same journal, Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr. (1940: 247) wrote about disturbances in global economy after 1929 due to ‘structural changes’ in the paper “Governmental Economic Planning”.

³⁵ Cf. Svendsen and Svendsen (2004) 128-29.

³⁶ Of these modernist-thinking, new leaders and experts was Anders Andersen, who during the 1960s headed the Danish National Confederation of Agricultural Syndicates, was President of the Danish Agricultural Council and an MP; economist Poul Nyboe Andersen, chairman of The Danish Union of Co-operative Wholesale Societies and of the Danish Agency for Promotion of Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries (1962-65); Johs. Dons Christensen, chairman of the Danish Co-operative Committee; Clemens Pedersen, editor of *Andelsbladet* during the period; professor Kjeld Philip, special consultant for The Danish Agency for Underdeveloped Countries on issues on agricultural co-operatives; and Torkil Mathiassen, head of the Danish Dairy Office.

³⁷ See *Andelsbladet* (Ab) 1963: 3.

³⁸ *Ugeskrift for Landmænd* (UfL) 1963: 733 (our translation).

From the mid-1960s, the advocates of centralisation became increasingly impatient to realize their idea of only *one* cooperative dairy company, *one* cooperative wholesale society association, *one* co-operative slaughterhouse association, *one* co-operative chemicals and feedstuff company, etc. At the same time, centralisation was recommended by experts in international organisations, for example the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), which was strongly in favour of a unity movement run by highly educated specialists.³⁹

Ideologically, the propaganda for full centralisation was rooted in the concept of a global development race. In this debate, influential arguments were that “other countries have overtaken Danish dairy production”, “the current methods of working are outdated”, “the Danish dairy industry must rationalise to keep its position among the leading countries”, “the dairy sector is lagging behind”.⁴⁰

That the time-honoured Danish co-operative dairy stood to lag behind in the near future was a worrying argument for all Danes, farmers and urbanites alike. Often such bogeys in the rural journals and magazines were supplemented by photos of poor people and primitive dairies in developing countries like Africa and India.⁴¹

[Fig. 1]

Thus, the dairy culture was considered a *barometer* indicating the degree of economic development, and the risk was that this sector would lose its position if it failed to rationalise production. The fear of involution and degeneration led to a general consensus among top leaders in the co-operative sectors that a full merger was the only option available to ensure survival under the ‘law of development’. To fail to obey this law was to (involuntarily!) go native, even to *become primitive* – in short, to descend the development ladder.

Establishment of a goodness ideology in Denmark

Evidently, the post-war development discourse in Denmark was not initiated domestically. As mentioned, the Latin terminology was imported from the US. Similarly, an altruistic ideology underpinning the new interest in development aid was imported, primarily from the UN institutions and Sweden. Thus, early on the article “Welfare state – welfare world” by Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal seemed to have had a major impact on the Scandinavian debate. The article, which was published in three sections in *Andelsbladet* from February to March 1961, was described by the editorial board as “a serious comment to the efforts to assist the underdeveloped countries”.⁴²

Myrdal posited that the main problem was the nationalistic economic policies pursued by rich Western European countries, which acted as a barrier to international economic integration.⁴³ In other words, the rich Western countries had strongly contributed to placing the underdeveloped countries in a vicious circle that prevented their industries from becoming competitive on the world market.⁴⁴ These evident

³⁹ *Ab* (1965), pp. 1186, 1368.

⁴⁰ *Ab* (1962), pp. 113, 125, 303, 958; *Ab* (1963), p. 1045.

⁴¹ *Ab* (1962), p. 958.

⁴² *Ab* (1961), p. 159.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Op.cit.*, p. 187.

shortcomings in the world economy tended to reinforce nationalistic groupings in the impoverished countries to such an extent that governments of underdeveloped countries would raise aggressive and undue demands for compensation from the rich countries, by Myrdal termed “extortion politics”.⁴⁵

Myrdal did not talk about Samaritan’s Dilemmas; he thought that the tension of economic exploitation and aggressive counter-reaction could only be solved through ‘The world revolution’. This revolution would wipe out poverty and clear the way to a global welfare society – a future strategy that was seen as “natural, necessary, correct [and which] moves in the direction of progress”.⁴⁶ Such *real* progress would lead to “a democratic welfare world, which involves increased international solidarity both from the side of rich and poor countries, and increased international co-operation in order to give all people in the whole world the same possibilities (..) a world society [which] bases on equality and everybody’s taking fully part in power”.⁴⁷

Thus, during the 1960s ordinary Danish farmers began to share with Myrdal and his Danish advocates a strong vision of a global social conscience, global justice and ultimately a *global welfare society world with no bad guys, only good guys*. This seems somewhat paradoxical, as these farmers only a few years previously had expressed scepticism about an ‘international solidarity’, which they associated with urban labour union mentality. Apart from journal articles such as letters to the editor, this ideological shift is also evident in a questionnaire survey carried out at the Annual Co-operative Wholesale Societies congress in 1966. To the question “Would you like to propose the members of your wholesale society to allocate 2 DKK of their annual dividends to the cooperative movements in the underdeveloped countries?” Two thirds of 316 delegates answered yes, while only the last third answered no (66 versus 34 per cent).⁴⁸

In *Andelsbladet*, the development assistance campaign took the form of seminars, conferences and articles authored by experts and consultants within the movement. The articles were often illustrated with pictures of poor, primitive and (often) black people. Overall, the message was that more development assistance was needed. In the mid 1960s typical headlines were: “Tragic riots must not weaken development aid from West”, “We have to contribute to international development aid”, “Work for underdeveloped countries is vital to us all”.⁴⁹

On the part of the experts, Myrdal-inspired economist Poul Nyboe Andersen was among the most important advocates of development aid from Denmark generally, and from the co-operative movement specifically.

Like Myrdal, Nyboe Andersen wanted to enhance the economic independence of underdeveloped populations. This was to happen in a process of democratisation where the Danish contribution would be “to enter into a positive co-operation with the

⁴⁵ Op.cit, p. 189.

⁴⁶ *Ab* (1961), p. 219.

⁴⁷ *Ab* (1961), p. 189. Whether Myrdal’s economic analysis was correct or not, it seems evident that the implicit development theory it builds on was the idea of a global development race with *equal* participants. In contrast, the evolutionist ideas of Herbert Spencer and Edward Tylor were *not* development as biologically determined evolution, i.e. conditioned by the physical, mental, social and cultural environments of various human races – polygenesis – involving naturally conditioned qualifications among participants in the global development race. Myrdal’s vision is very similar to that of nineteenth century Christian English altruists, who emphasized the unity of human races in that every human being was created by the same God (Hirst 1976; H.E. Augstein, “Physical Anthropology: Natural Similarity”, *Clio Medica*, vol 52, no. 1: 57-104 (1999). In this monogenetic version, all races had the same opportunities to ascend the evolutionary ladder, because they were made of the same material – although lack of Christian enlightenment could act as a barrier.

⁴⁸ *Ab* (1966), p. 129.

⁴⁹ *Ab* (1965), p. 31; *Ab* (1965), p. 124; *Ab* (1966), p. 422.

developing countries through our help to them, and to give them knowledge of how we in the Western world have solved our societal problems”.⁵⁰ Following Nyboe Andersen, a co-operative organisational form implemented in the poor countries was to act as help to self-help – just as the agricultural co-operative movement had done in nineteenth century rural Denmark.⁵¹

That a Danish/Scandinavian co-operative movement with rich democratic traditions would be able to contribute significantly to development in poor countries became a widespread assumption in Denmark in the early 1960s. For example, in the of the Freedom instead of Hunger campaign in spring 1964, Kjeld B. Juul, consultant in the organisation Danish Association for International Co-operation (*Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke*) and later on FAO, used the development rhetoric of the day when stating in an interview that he recognised “the Scandinavian countries to be the most enlightened in the world”. Furthermore, they “should engage themselves in a large-scale co-operative project, which they have the prerequisites to carry out”.⁵²

This thinking was in line with the vision of the international co-operative movement as the most important element in development work and it was promoted by powerful international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and International Co-operative Association (ICA). However, even if they shared this vision, such organisations were often in mutual *competition* to implement the co-operative model in recipient countries – a fact widely documented in the Danish agricultural journals of the 1960s, not least *Andelsbladet*.⁵³

Overall, the importance of international development aid organisations after World War II appears vast in Denmark, a Scandinavian welfare-society in the making. The historical sources clearly document that these aid organisations – most of them sub-organisations under the umbrella organisation of the UN – put considerable pressure on national governments. For example, at the ILO conference in Geneva in 1966 a resolution was unanimously decided recommending all member states to promote co-operative movements as “one of the most important means to economic, social and cultural development as well as human progress in the developing countries”.⁵⁴ In 1966, such a recommendation was most often seen as a request, nurtured by bad conscience among former colonial-imperial Western populations.

[Fig. 2]

We thereby understand why the idea of the Danish co-operative movement having a special mission in development work soon got full political support. According to Prime Minister Krag (1963), “There is no doubt that our co-operative movement can be transplanted to more primitive forms – and the co-operative principle appeals to the underdeveloped countries”.⁵⁵ Likewise, foreign minister Hækkerup stated (1964) that a co-operative movement striking the golden mean between capitalism and communism, “beyond any doubt [has] great prospects in the underdeveloped countries”.⁵⁶

The arguments used by protagonists of Danish development assistance can be parsed into three main strains, all sharing the underlying assumption of ‘the global

⁵⁰ *Ab* (1963), p. 1280.

⁵¹ See also Svendsen and Svendsen 2004.

⁵² *Ab* (1964), p. 688.

⁵³ E.g. *Ab* (1965), pp. 923, 1186, 1304; *Ab* (1966), p. 860; *Ab* (1968), p. 1128; *Ab* (1970), p. 70.

⁵⁴ *Ab* (1966), p. 860.

⁵⁵ *Ab* (1963), p. 60.

⁵⁶ *Ab* (1964), p. 511.

development race’.

First, major Danish development aid was grounded in sincere concern about ‘global disasters’ (world war, political instability, overpopulation, etc.), which Myrdal and other experts warned would be the natural consequence of the chronic imbalance in the world economy. However, this overall concern did not preclude *self-interest* in the form of cultivating future markets for Danish exports.⁵⁷ Here the underdeveloped populations were seen as constituting a vast potential market.⁵⁸ Finally, the third argument was *moral duty to help people in need*. Judging from the journal articles, this seemingly non-economic rationale for a Danish development aid appears to be the most important one, here labelled ‘goodness ideology’.

This purportedly civil (liberal) duty was also termed ‘global social consciousness’, that is, a Christian-altruistic social consciousness ‘extended’ to (primitive) populations living in other time-space dimensions. In a manifesto article by one of the most prominent leaders within the co-operative movement entitled “Think in time – let’s share our ‘fortune’”, the Danish rural population learned that Danes had been too “slow” to help the underdeveloped countries. In order to change this, the best remedy would be “a national enlightenment work (...) that should make people more sympathetic towards the perspectives of the development aid” – an enlightenment work, which, it was stated, should aim to reach “the inner corners of secure Danish cosiness [*hygge*]”.⁵⁹ The imperative go be good, or to *do* good (even in the face of meagre development aid results), is also reflected in many other statements. Typical assertions were that of professor Pihl, who announced in 1961 that “today, it is beyond dispute that development aid is (...) a civil duty”; or an *Andelsbladet* editorial from 1961 arguing for the necessity of a “total change of our attitude towards underdeveloped peoples [an attitude, which previously] has been rooted in a mindset dating back to colonial times”.⁶⁰

It is interesting to observe that in their efforts to legitimise such unilateral gift-giving and national propaganda campaigns, the three key arguments were conflated – albeit always resting firmly on the moral imperative to help *all* people in need. Danish hesitation to grant even *more* money was according to *Andelsbladet* due to: “a lack of understanding, not only of people in great need, but also of the dangers inherent in not sharing with others our affluent society, whether it be in the form of education, money or something else [or we will risk] a very dangerous tension between the “rich” Northern hemisphere and the “poor” Southern hemisphere”, etc. And finally, the typical ‘allochronic’ closing remark, which more than anything echoes the amazing decade of the 1960s: “Let us not come too late with our aid, because we did not think in time”.⁶¹

The Danish Co-operative Movement and The white man’s burden

The sources indicate that we should not underestimate the moral argument and the ‘goodness ideology’ behind it. It is quite amazing that an otherwise conservative and

⁵⁷ For example, Nyboe Andersen stated in 1965 that: “in the long run, a good contact to, and goodwill in, the developing countries may enhance Danish agricultural exports”. In a true altruistic spirit he hastened to add that primarily, “the economical, technical and social development within Danish agriculture during the last century contains elements of high value for the ongoing development in poor agricultural countries all over the world” (*Ab* 1965, p. 261).

⁵⁸ E.g. *Ab* (1965), pp. 78ff.

⁵⁹ *Ab* (1964), p. 510.

⁶⁰ *Dansk Ungdom* (DU) [Danish Youth] (1961), p. 150; *Ab* (1961), p. 210.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

local-oriented rural peasant population (the Danish word *bonde*, peasant, originally meant ‘settled’) in a couple of years became convinced of the necessity to help people in need across the globe. In this way, ‘the global social consciousness’ was adopted between 1960 and 1965 not only by urban Denmark – ever since, the ‘ideology of goodness’ has been an integral part of the Danish worldview and self-understanding, reflected in increased development aid from the Danish state, social science research and rapid growth in charity organisations, accompanied by various charity concerts and money collection drives – the effects of which *can be highly doubted*, to put it mildly.⁶²

It is also interesting how closely the ideology of goodness is linked to the idea of a global development race – a time threat or lack of time used as the main engine for an ‘industry’ of good deeds beyond personal contact. Based on that worldview, it was believed that Danish nineteenth century co-operative history would – or *ought* to – repeat itself in primitive ‘time lagged’ countries.

So, after World War II and especially in the first part of the 1960s the ‘extended social sense of responsibility’, which first appeared in Danish social legislation late in the nineteenth century in response to harsh economic liberalism, also came to include other nations in a post-colonial context. In short, it was a renaissance of what may be summarized as ‘the white man’s burden’.⁶³

The white man’s burden implied a moral imperative, the purpose of which was to mitigate what the old Greeks called *iriniyas* (goddesses of revenge), who would justly cast their *nemesis* upon former colonial masters: The feeling was that we from the West had invoked the anger of God and therefore had to right the wrongs we had committed, for example through exports of money and technical assistance. “I believe”, as Danish foreign minister Hækkerup stated in 1964, “that we [Danes] generally have done too little for the underdeveloped countries”.⁶⁴ His point was that Danes at that time had an extraordinary chance to ‘help along’ (*ophjælpe*) the poor populations, as it was often expressed. That is, to help them *speed up* their climb up the development ladder, thus allowing them to approach the same high level as the Danes. “One has to remember”, Hækkerup continued, “that the development necessarily has to proceed step by step, even though that the underdeveloped countries, assisted by the developed countries, can reach our technical and economic level in much shorter time than we have done ourselves”.⁶⁵

Later that year, in December 1964, an editorial in *Andelsbladet* baldly stated that the real mission was to bring civilisation to the primitive populations in the underdeveloped countries, not least to “dark Africa”. Here, the Danish co-operative movement was to contribute to bring to Africans “edifying, developing forces”. However, the editorial board could not promise the readers just “when these good forces get the better of ignorance, war and other evil forces in Africa”.⁶⁶ These and a host of other similar statements illustrate the whole atmosphere of bad Christian consciousness and the desire to repent and pay indulgence. This goodness syndrome was an important argument for development aid in general, as well as for ‘exporting Danish co-operative principles’, specifically.

The implicit thesis of a ‘white man’s burden’ was confirmed on a regular basis by

⁶² M. Paldam, *Dansk u-landshjælp. Altruismens politiske økonomi*. Århus Universitetsforlag, Aarhus (1997).

⁶³ G.L.H. Svendsen, “Andelsbevægelsen og den hvide mands byrde. Et bidrag til en antropologisk-historisk belysning af dansk u-landsbistand 1960-70”. *Historie*, no. 2: 263-309 (2002). Easterly (2006a).

⁶⁴ *Ab* (1964), p. 512.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ab* (1964), p. 1493.

the movement's consultants employed in development projects abroad. They saw the co-operative principles as a means to escape primitiveness. Especially from 1964-1970 these consultants and experts wrote articles rich on statements and headings like "The farmers of Guiana mix milk with water from the rivers", "The agricultural consultants have to teach the Africans better methods of cultivation", "Development aid to the underdeveloped countries creates a new way of thinking", "The need for propagating the co-operative principles is enormous in Gambia", "A reorganisation of the co-operative movement in Tanzania would give members considerable economic gains", etc.⁶⁷ In this context, the term 'co-operative *upbringing*' was often applied, both within the Danish co-operative movement and in the ICA.⁶⁸

On several occasions, the white man's burden was confirmed by the underdeveloped peoples themselves, but only by the most 'modernistic' thinking among them, typically young men with university education visiting Denmark to participate in seminars on the issue arranged by the co-operative movement.⁶⁹ Thus, in their eagerness to partake in The Development several of these people described their own peoples as 'primitive' or 'backwards', for example the school leader in Holsteinsborg, Greenland – which along with the Faroe Islands was recognized as an underdeveloped country at that time, albeit an underdeveloped one the Danish co-operative movement wanted to help before all others.⁷⁰

Thus, during the 1960s the ideology of goodness combined with one of a global development race were conflated and reflected in large scale development aid. This is very similar to what happened in Norway where "realist arguments" gradually lost ground to "aid rhetoric" after World War II.⁷¹ Overall, it is surprising to see the *lack* of clear and sound arguments for development aid in the Western European countries, including important donor countries such as the UK⁷² and France.⁷³ And astonishingly, such countries have since the 1950s *continued* to donate resources to regions unknown to the vast majority of Europeans – in the same 'allochronic' and a-personal way as always, voluntarily and *without even being able to account for the precise effects*.

As we have argued, in Denmark this happened due to Christian-European evolutionary ideology (monogenesis) aided by strong discursive effects. Where might such effects be traced to in actual practice during the 1960s? Danish employees in national and international organisations put pressure on the government, indicating that Denmark was lagging behind in a rather distinguished – and distinguishing – global development aid race among the rich countries. "Denmark donates 0.16 percent of its GNP to development aid", lamented Kjeld B. Juul in 1964, "while in the United States it has been decided to aim at granting one percent of GNP".⁷⁴ In sum, also here the laws of development seemed to govern the debate, reflected in statements like "there is a necessity of" and "it is necessary" [to grant more money].

In the 1960s, the pro-agitators successfully convinced politicians to increase total Danish development aid to one percent of GNP as suggested by the UN – even though

⁶⁷ *Ab* (1965), p. 1506; *Ab* (1966), p. 295; *Ab* (1969), pp. 97, 187; *Ab* (1970), p. 807.

⁶⁸ E.g. *Ab* (1962), p. 969; *Ab* (1965), p. 1143; *Ab* (1966), pp. 296-97. About ICA: *Ab* (1965), pp. 258, 1186.

⁶⁹ *Ab* (1970), p. 1065; *Ab* (1963), pp. 451ff., 1011ff.

⁷⁰ *Ab* (1964), p. 1043. See also *Ab* (1963), pp. 451ff.; *Ab* (1966), p. 129.

⁷¹ H. Pharo, "Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil: Norway's Foreign Economic Assistance Policy, 1958-1971". *Contemporary European History*, vol. 12, no. 4: 527-546 (2003), p. 546.

⁷² Tomlinson, "The Commonwealth, the Balance of Payments and the Politics of International Poverty: British Aid Policy, 1958-1971", *Contemporary European History*, vol 12, no. 4: 431-456 (2003).

⁷³ Bossuat, *The Logic of Practice*, Cambridge: Polity Press (2003).

⁷⁴ *Ab* (1964), pp. 687-88.

some development aid enthusiasts had demanded a minimum of 3-4 percent (that is, just for starters, in phase one!). Moreover, leaders, consultants and experts within the co-operative movement convinced ordinary members that the Danish co-operative movement should take the lead in regards to technical assistance – which they certainly did.

Conclusion

This contribution was able to trace back the new development terminology of rural Denmark after 1945 to nineteenth century evolutionist and physiocratic thinking. Our literature was Danish agricultural journals of the 1960s and we used the discourse analysis method. The value of this study is that based on concrete evidence in the form of contemporary journals, our analysis revealed how ideology, a new ‘aid speak’, paved the way for concrete policy proposals with regard to Danish development aid after 1945. We further claimed that Danish development aid illustrated the Samaritan’s Dilemma because the ‘goodness’ ideology necessarily contains the perception of some people as primitive and helpless. The paradox is that in this game, it may be advantageous for the recipient to stay helpless. Donor motives seem to be based almost solely on the dominant strategy of being good. Recipients are thereby encouraged to exploit the situation when a donor is willing to help. The specific case of Danish development aid during the 1960s appears to confirm Buchanan’s Samaritan’s Dilemma hypothesis.

Using a historical-anthropological approach, we showed that technical development assistance within the famous Danish agriculturalist, co-operative movement was linked to an evolutionist ideology of developed and backward populations. Together with a strong altruistic Christian moral incentive to help – rooted in nineteenth century monogenesis evolutionist thought – otherwise conservative farmers were convinced of the necessity to help the underdeveloped peoples. The impact of the post-war development aid discourse clearly involved an ‘ideology of goodness’ in Denmark and, ultimately, a Samaritan’s Dilemma – which was also the case in many other Western European countries during that period. This ideology has laid the foundation for development aid in its present form and should, preferably, be changed if the desired goal of a more equal relationship between the nations of the world is to be achieved.